Have scientists ever knowingly lied to us?

201 6. About lies and deceit To start from clear terms: that, my friends, is what one has to pay attention to first in any investigation. Even today, when we want to talk about the duty of truthfulness, we must first establish the concept that we associate with this word.516 In several lectures, mostly widely spaced in time, Bolzano examines our concepts of various types of deception and attempted deception. 517 Bolzano is primarily concerned with moral questions in these exhorts. But every time he does a conceptual analysis before his moral and philosophical considerations. Sections 1-5 deal with these analyzes and the relationships between the analyzed terms, which become visible in the synopsis of the speeches relevant to our term family. In an appendix I will define the term forgery, a product of lies and deceit, and tell the story of two forgeries that will remind us of the topic of the last chapter. 516. See § 6.5. 517. In this chapter I correct Künne (12) in many respects, and in doing so I occasionally fall back on revisions that I made in Künne (18), Chapter 1, § 2. The exhorts relevant to the following are - in the order in which they are taken into account: No. 475 (1817) on deception and fraud, in ER 22/2, 252-259, No. 267 (1810) on self-deception, in ER 17/2, 488–496, No. 341 (1812) about hypocrisy, in ER 19/1, 221–232, No. 245 (1810) about lies and truthfulness, in ER 17/2, 291–303. Positions in the main text are made in the style of 22 (22/2, 252) ’. Regarding the text of the speeches in the new edition, which misrepresents the title of no. 475, see the corrections, conjectures and annotations in chap. 7. 202 6.1. Deception In the exhortation I start from, Bolzano tries to convince his audience that “it is a shameful principle to deceive the world because it wants to be deceived” (22/2, 253). The Latin model of this saying - “Mundus vult decipi, ergo de cipia tur” - is said to go back to statements made by an Italian cardinal who was on a diplomatic mission in Paris in 1556.518 The 518. The first half of the “shameful principle ”Is older - you can find it in German in Sebastian Brant's Ship of Fools (Basel 1494, chap. 'Von Ach tung des Gestirns'):“ Die weltt die will betrrogen syn ”, and in Latin in Sebastian Franck's Paradoxa (1534, no. 236) : "Mundus vult decipi." Georg Büchmann (1), 120, not only identified this evidence, but also the Italian source of the much-cited two-part saying “…, ergo de cipiatur”. The French statesman and historian Jacques Au guste de Thou (Latinized: Thuanus), who worked for Henry IV, reports in his Historia mei temporis (in the 17th [!] Book) that the papal legate Cardinal Carafa had in 1556 in Paris “often murmuring behind closed hands, repeating the following words: Since this people wants to be duped, it will be duped (saepius secreta muratione haec verba ingeminasse, Quandoquidem populus iste vult de cipi, decipiatur ) '”; see Thou (1), Vol. 1, 480. In the French translation, the saying sounds like this: “Trompons ce Peuple, puisqu’il veut être trompé”; See Thou (2), Vol. 2, 417. Thou ascribes a hypo-tactical variant of the slogan to Carafa, in which ‘People’ is used instead of World ’. But the message is the same, and B.'s formulation of the principle is also hypotactic. Büchmann is wrong - and Künne (12), 122 AD, with him - when he identifies the papal legate as Cardinal (Gian Pietro) Carafa, who called himself Pope Paul IV. In 1556 he had been Pope for a year. One of his first official acts was to appoint his nephew, the condottiere Carlo Carafa, as cardinal, and de Thou speaks of this cardinal, who was in Paris as papal legate in 1556. Five years later, Carlo Carafa was executed in Castel Sant'Angelo at the instigation of the next Pope, Pius IV - not because of the “shameful principle” but because he was accused of murder, homosexuality and heresy. See Hsia (1), 19, and TRE s. V. ‘Pius IV. 203“ World ”, Bolzano objects to the German version of this dictum, although sometimes she wants to be deceived - she certainly does not want to be cheated. Because “fraud and deception are very well to be distinguished” (22/2, 255). Let's start with the question: what is a delusion? (This beginning will also prove its worth in what follows; for in the family of concepts which this chapter deals with, the concept of deception is fundamental.) Bolzano's answer is: “Deception is the endeavor by means of which we generate an idea in another that is not in accordance with the truth. ”519“ Endeavor ”here means something like“ deliberate action ”(in the following for short:“ action ”). For what is meant by imagination’520 in this quote, we will find a more apt expression a few lines later (and much better suited to Bolzano’s later use of the language in science): opinion ’. Bolza no calls an opinion “not according to the truth” precisely when its content (material) is wrong. In addition, we should already take into account at this point what Bolzano will emphasize when analyzing the concept of hypocrisy: Those who deceive do not always generate a wrong opinion - sometimes they just ensure that a wrong opinion persists. So we get: 519. This is the definition in ‘Bolzano's terms. 1821 ', B (78a), 256. This formulation fits better with the continuation of the speech than the one handed down in 22/2, 255, which in truth defines the concept of an attempt at deception: “We deceive someone when an idea we seek to bring forward in him that is not in accordance with the truth. " B (78a) is a collection of term explanations completed in January 1821, which Florian Werner (1793–1863) et al. selected from unprinted exhorts at the time. Werner had studied with B. from 1810/11, was a colleague of Fesl's professor of moral theology in Leitmeritz and finally became a village pastor after the Leitmeritz Bolzano district was dissolved by the police. See Künne (20), chap. IX / 1-2. In his hands there was also a “plan of all morality” drawn up by B. see Bolza nos letters to Příhonský from 17.1. and 9.2.1835, BGA 3.3 / 1, 271 and 280. 520. And in 22/2, 255, 295f., as we will see, with ‘term’. 204 (T1) x deceives y: ↔ ∑p ([1] x causes y through his actions that y the opinion that p, acquires or keeps & [2] ¬p). Please understand the quantifier ‘‘p’ as an abbreviation of the prologue ‘for at least one replacement of the variable‘ p ’with a statement sentence. According to (T1) only one actor can deceive and only one opinion subject can be deceived. Clause [2] registers that the verb ‘to deceive’ (like to think ’) is contra factual: a being is only deceived if it is mistaken, i.e. mistaken. With this use of to be mistaken ’, the reflexive pronoun does not of course signal a reflexive structure in re: there is just as little here as in‘ to be mistaken ’an answer to the question who or what?’. The following example of (deliberate) deception seems to contradict this definition. Where will Admiral X's enemy troops land? General Y asks himself. He currently thinks they will land on the coast near Süddorf. X is actually planning a landing near Süddorf, but uses targeted information to ensure that Y gains the belief that the enemy troops will land at Süddorf or Norddorf. In fact, they land in Süddorf. - The belief acquired by Y is not wrong; but is not there still a deception? Answer: As long as Y only acquires the stated disjunctive belief, Y has not been deceived; but under the given circumstances, Y will have acquired the belief through this that it would be good to prepare for a landing near Süddorf as well as one near Norddorf. And that belief is wrong. According to the first clause in the definition of (T1), a being only deceives when it acts, i.e. when it deliberately does something. If a very healthy child by accidentally sneezing several times arouses the wrong opinion in its worried mother that it has a cold, or encourages her in this opinion, it has not deceived her in the sense of (T1); because his sneezing is not intentional under any (correct) 205 description. - In this as well as in the following definitions, effecting through action ’is to be understood in a broad sense: what someone causes through his action also includes everything that he fails to prevent. A less demanding concept of deception could be defined by leaving out the phrase ‘by acting’ in clause [1] of (T1). Then you can say that a clock that goes wrong is deceiving us. In the sense of the abbreviated explanation, behavioral researchers often speak of deception: 521 The bird deceives the creeping predator when it flutters around on the ground as if it were injured, thus distracting the attacker towards itself and from its nest. If the ‘action-free’ variant of (T1) is used as a basis, one can also say that some butterflies deceive potential attackers with peacock eyes ’on their wings. Between the lame, fluttering bird and an easy prey, between the wing ornaments and real eyes, there is always a deceptive resemblance. (In both cases, it is of course assumed that one can rightly write an opinion to the attacking animal.) But even according to the more demanding term that (T1) defines, not every deception under the description 'deception' is intended Lich.522 A deception in the sense of (T1) can be unintentional in two respects: (i) Actor X does not intend at all to make Y believe something wrong. Y may misunderstand the statements of X so much that they make Y a supporter of a false thesis, which X also considers false. Or: X 521. Cf. the discussion of relevant ethological literature in Dreckmann (1), 25–30. 522. That one and the same act can be intentional in one respect and unintentional in another is a commonplace of action theory: Oedipus ’proposal to the widow of the King of Thebes was a proposal to his mother; but the proposal was deliberate only under that, not under this description. 206 packs her suitcase. 523 But she by no means thinks of leaving anytime soon (and neither does it); she just packs her suitcase to find out how much it can hold. Without wanting to, len, she makes Y think by packing her suitcase that she will soon be traveling. - A deception in the sense of (T1) can also be unintentional in the following respects: (ii) The actor himself considers what he causes Y to believe to be true. He succeeds in convincing Y through his explanations of a thesis that he himself accepts; but this thesis is wrong. Or: X is thinking of going away soon and is packing her suitcase. In doing so, she wants to make Y believe something she believes herself, and she succeeds. But nothing will come of the trip. Again, there are unintentional deceptions. Bolzano takes both aspects into account when he says: we are deceiving someone “on purpose [...] when we act with knowledge and will in such a way that that erroneous term [524] arises in him, and [if we] also see its erroneousness”. (22/2, 255). The fact that the deceiver X sees (and therefore knows) that the opinion acquired by Y is an error is likely to be too strong a requirement: X does not even have to consider what he causes Y to believe to be wrong - perhaps he thinks it is neither true nor false. We shall see that Bolzano himself takes this possibility into account in his explanation of the concept of planned self-deception. 523. See Kant (11), 286, 524. In his exhorts, B. uses the word ‘term’ (unlike later in science) very often in the sense of view ’, opinion’, conviction ’. This usage was not unusual. When Schiller says in his essay about the Schaubühne about the views that well-meaning parents often let themselves be determined by when bringing up their children: “Wrong terms mislead the educator's best heart” (cf. Schiller (1), vol. 20, 23), he uses this word like B. in our place, and Goethe does it when he says in the 9th Book of Poetry and Truth about a bizarre acquaintance from Strasbourg: “A certain concept is easily established in such people [...]. He always came back to such a fixed view ”(cf. Goethe (1) vol. 16, 408). 207 We can codify the definition that Bolzano intended, in the style of (T1) as follows: (T2) x deliberately deceives y: ↔ ∑p ([1] x caused by his action in the manner intended by x that y is of the opinion that p, acquires or retains & [2] ¬p & [3] x believes that ¬p). Accordingly, deception is unintentional if and only if condition [1] or condition [3] is not met.525 Some philosophers assume that 'deceive' means' intentionally mislead '(' intentionally mislead ') 526 (If you are right, then an unintentional deception is natural 525. In [1] it is not only required that X do what he wanted to do through his actions. In my opinion, the following example shows that this requirement together with [2] and [3] is not sufficient to be able to speak of an intentional deception: - By singing a German folk song in the forest, the Frenchman X wants to achieve his goal, that of the one coming towards him Wanderer Y thinks he is German. His singing actually has the desired effect. But Y did not even recognize the language in which X was singing: Y rather, from the fact that X was singing in the forest, Y concluded that he was German ; because Y believes that only Deut singing in the forest. X then did not achieve the desired effect “in the way he intended”. X misled Y, but he didn't deliberately deceive him. (I thank Tobias Rosefeld for pointing out this problem.) 526. So inter alia. Dennett (1), 275ff. On the other hand, inter alia. Oscar Wilde: "Forgive me, sir," mothered James Vane. “I was deceived. A chance word I heard in that damned den set me on the wrong track. ”'(The Picture of Dorian Gray, chap. 16), The Oxford English Dictionary:' deceive - cause to believe what is false ', Mele (1) , 122f., 168 n. 3. The Duden editorial team seems to believe that (i) 'deliberately give someone a wrong impression' and (ii) 'mislead them' are equivalent explanations of 'deceive'. Those who stick with Dennett and Duden (i) should replace ‘x deceives y’ in (T1) etc. with ‘x leads y astray’. 208 It is just as absurd as unintentional murder.) Anyone who in this sense says of the tricky bird just mentioned that he is deceiving the predator by his diversionary maneuver is attesting to the second-level intentionality of the bird: an intention aimed at an opinion '. 527 followers of the theory of evolution, who even speak of deliberate deception in the case of the peacock butterfly, attribute second-order intentionality to' mother nature ': she wants the attackers of the butterfly to acquire an erroneous opinion. Anyone who seriously says that the clock is going wrong, that it is deliberately misleading him, is suspected of panpsychistic activities or a case for the psychiatrist (or both). The concept of concealment, which is closely related to that defined by (T2), can be explained as follows: (T3) x hides something from y: ↔ ∑p ([1] x causes through its action in the way intended by x, that y does not acquire the opinion that p & [2] p & [3] x believes that p) When we conceal something, we conceal something, but the converse does not apply: in the case of concealment, there is concealment clear fact that the subject x has a certain 'pro positional attitude' (e.g.a certain desire, a certain conviction). In a sense of intentional deception wider than that defined above, a person will intentionally deceive another when he or she fulfills either the definition of (T2) or the definition of (T3). 527. “Let us define a second order intentional system as one to which we ascribe not only simple beliefs, desires and other intentions, but beliefs, desires, and other intentions about beliefs, desires, and other intentions,” Dennett said (1) , 273.209 6.2. Fraud Not everyone who wears a wig is a fraud, even if he deliberately deceives us with his hairpiece; Cardsharps, however, are fraudsters. Fraud is a special form of deliberate deception. Bolzano continues: in certain cases, deliberate deception can deserve the name of fraud [...]. If the intention we have in deceiving our fellow man [528] is innocent, if we are not intended to harm him in any way, but rather to benefit him: then we can also be reproached by no means make us want to deceive him [...]. This is how language usage once established the meaning of this word (22/2, 255). When explaining this term, we have to take into account the motivation of the actor, and we can do that in the following way: (T4) x cheats y: ↔ [1] x deliberately deceives y & [2] x wants by [ 1], acquire an advantage over y or harm y. The cardsharp wants to “give his fellow gamblers an advantage” 529 (ibid.), Iago 528. Cf. the appendix on language (51). 529. We expect here to 'take advantage', not so the contemporary reader: “Attentive to every opportunity to gain the desired advantage, [Jacob] denies his brother the right of the birthright and prefers him for the blessing of the father” ( Poetry and Truth, 4th book, in Goethe (1), Vol. 16, 149). Adelung: “Advantage, […]: by unduly promoting one's advantage, come too close to another […]. Sometimes this word also has the secondary concept of a cunning used in it, and is then as much as if Othello wants to deprive another person of his advantage with cunning if he deceives him. But if we deliberately “trick a child into taking the necessary medicine or throwing a dangerous toy out of their hands”, then we do not cheat the child (ibid.). 530 In his last novella, 'Die Betrogene' (1953), Thomas Mann tells of Rosalie, a mature widow who passionately falls in love with her son's tutor. One day she is surprised and delighted by a physical occurrence that she believes is a return to the cycle that she believed to have dried up. She enthusiastically tells her skeptical daughter and confidante Anna about the bleeding, in which she sees a gift with which nature reacts to her passion. In reality, the bleeding is the result of a malignant tumor. On her deathbed, Rosalie says to her daughter: “Anna, don't speak of deceit and the scornful cruelty of nature […]. If [death] gave me the shape of resurrection and lust for love, it was [...] goodness and grace. " Both mother and daughter assume what they call nature to be deceitful - they only disagree on the question of whether it is a deception. Rosalie praises nature, Anna accuses her. But nature is likely to be beyond praise and blame: it caused Rosalie's error neither with bad nor with good intent, it simply caused it. The allegedly betrayed was only deceived - in the sense of the action-free ’variant of (T1). In 1779 the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin asked a question suggested by Frederick the Great: “Est […]. Note. Advantage means profit in standard German today. Advantage should therefore have exactly the opposite of its present-day meaning, namely: profit, bring benefit. " 530. Even if (T4) explains the Definiendum correctly in the sense of 'x cheats y', one can have doubts that it also applies to 'x cheats on y' in the sense of 'x cheats on y' ('x is the partner / unfaithful to partner y ') is correct. (I thank Hanjo Glock for pointing this out.) - The legal use of the word is always narrower: fraud is only fraud in the criminal sense if the fraudster's intention is to enrich himself and his actions to damage the defeated person's property causes. 211 il utile au Peuple d’être trompé, soit qu’on l’induise dans de nou velles erhurs, ou qu’on l’entretienne dans celles où il est? ” (No fewer than 42 applications were received. The price was divided between the writing of a French mathematics professor, who said yes, and that of a German teacher, who said no.) That Bolzano's remark “Fraud and deception are very different” (22/2, 255) still has to be repeated today, can be seen (not only) from the title of the first edition of all the writings sent in, which was published a few years ago - it reads: “Use it for the people, cheated To become? ”531 At the same time, the academy itself translated its French title into German much better. “Can any kind of deception be beneficial to the people, it now consists in enticing them to new insanities or letting the old rooted ones continue?” 532 6.3. Self-deception A particularly complex and conceptually very confusing case of deliberate deception is self-deception.533 (Although we speak of self-deception in German, so-called self-deception is no more deception than so-called suicide Murder is.534 So let's stick to Bolzano's vocabulary.) Can there even be such a thing as self-deception? "How can you fool yourself?" (17/2, 492). As the suffix self ’shows, the reflexive pronoun in this use of to be mistaken’ signals a reflexive structure in re: here it is an ant 531. Cf. H.Adler (1). 532. If one persists (T4), the deed that saves the life of a child, which Ovid describes as 'pia fraus' in Metamorphoses IX, 711, is not a fraud, and the pious deception of which B. in RW I, 317f., Letting an opponent speak is perhaps pious, but in any case not a fraud. 533. No. 267. See also RW I, 55f., 365f., And WL III, 202f., 385f. 534. The expression ‘lying something in your own pocket’ is probably also mostly meant to deceive yourself. 212 word to the question Who? (The predicate x is wrong ’is therefore equivalent to‘ x is wrong x ’in this speech.)“ You may - I hear myself objecting - be able to deceive others, but never yourself; one cannot make something seem true to us if one knows and sees that it is false ”(17/2, 492f.). Jean Paul Sartre describes the situation as follows: “As a deceiver, I must know the truth that is hidden from me as someone who has been deceived” .535 This is a problem with the concept of self-deception, be it intentional or not, that one referred to as the “Paradox of Belief ”.536 The problem occurs in two variants: (i) If person X deceives another person Y, then X brings about a situation in which the following applies: While X believes that not p, Y thinks that p. In order to deceive himself, X seems to have to create a situation in which the following applies: X believes that not p, and at the same time X also believes that p. But how is that possible? After all, this would not be a hidden contradiction in the corpus of their convictions, but a logically all too obvious one. (ii) If a person X deceives another person Y, then X creates a situation in which: It is not the case that X believes that p, but Y believes that p. In order to deceive itself, X seems to have to create a situation in which the following applies: It is not the case that X believes that p, and it is the case. But that is certainly impossible; for now we have got ourselves caught up in a contradiction in characterizing the doxastic state of X. To make matters worse, a third difficulty arises with the concept of planned self-deception, the so-called “Strat egy Para dox” .537 X can only deliberately deceive another person Y if Y does not recognize X's intention and X has fallen asleep gene strategy not seen through. How should someone then be able to use a targeted and successful strategy to deceive themselves 535. Sartre (1), 123. 536. Mele (1), 121. 537. Ibid., 138. 213? Sartre says of the attempt at deliberate self-deception that it is inevitable that one will “fail completely at this enterprise” .538 Despite all these conceptual difficulties, Bolzano believes “that there is nothing impossible in the desire to find oneself in this or to knowingly deceive that piece (17/2, 493) and that one does not have to fail in any attempt to realize this intention. His resolution of the two paradoxes is based on the assumption that self-deception is a process through which “a certain opinion arises in the human being that he himself initially considered incorrect or at least unproven” 539 - a process that takes a while: (T5) x deliberately deceives x: ↔ ∑p ([0] ∃t ∃t * [t is earlier than t * & [1] x caused by acting in the way x to t intended, that x at t * the opinion that p, acquires] & [2] ¬p & [3] (x believes at t that ¬ p) ∨ ¬ (x believes at t that p)]). If one deletes the clause [2] in the definition, one obtains an explanation of the concept of self-persuasion ('x persuades x to believe something'), which, as I show elsewhere, plays an important role in Bolzano's philosophy of religion. 540 The following example suggests that this term is not empty: 541 - In January, Ms. X is asked to meet a very unpleasant contemporary on November 1st. She notes this appointment in her calendar but under December 1st, in order to miss the fatal date. She knows that she has a bad memory, and she is confident that by then she will 538. Sartre (1), 123. 539. B (78a), 252. 540. See Künne (20), chap . IV / 15. 541. See McLaughlin (1), 189ff. 214 will have long since forgotten that she deliberately made a wrong entry a few months earlier. And that's exactly what happens: She misses the November appointment because she relies on her schedule and thus gets a wrong opinion. - Bolzano describes a strategy that is more complex than Ms. X's approach in the appointment calendar example, but no less efficient: Of course, it would be incomprehensible if, at the moment when we are just starting to deceive, we also go to Stan de should bring; if at the very time when we do not yet believe something to be true, but only wish to hold it true, we should believe in it. As long as we still have the will to deceive ourselves, and we are also clearly aware of this [will542]: as long as we are not deceived either; but we are there in a short [543] time. For if we decide to convince ourselves of this or that view of a thing, we turn all our attention to all the more or less tenable reasons that this view seems to have for itself; on the other hand, we deliberately look away from all counter-reasons. As a result, it gradually happens that this view takes hold of us ever deeper and deeper, becomes more and more familiar to us, always comes into closer connection with our other convictions, gains more and more confidence, until we do respect them equally at the end of the strict truth. (17/2, 494) Here is a (fictional?) Case of such self-deception from university life: - Applicant X for the professorship was de facto rejected solely because of poor qualifications, but he would only be too happy to firmly believe that completely different, si nis tre Grün 542. In the first print as in the new edition, it says 'means', which is obviously a print or a reading error. 543. Time will hardly always be short. 215 en led to its rejection. X categorically avoids thinking about his slender oeuvre, about his meager application form and about his failure in the subsequent discussion. Instead, he keeps reminding himself of what his all-too-well-meaning friends (who had every means to help him get over his disappointment) have counted from the incompetent members of the Appeals Committee, from the the decisive role of the gender of the successful competitor, the aversion of the chairperson of the committee to X's supervisor, etc. etc. And finally, X believes that he was rejected for completely different reasons than lack of qualification. In the appointment calendar example, the initial situation was of the type that the first disjunct indicates in clause [3] of (T5), in the case just described it is of the type that the second disjoint indicates. In both cases, the initial 'disbelief' is replaced by the desired belief.544 The gradual stabilization of a belief threatened by doubts by concentrating on everything and only that which speaks for it. Just like the simpler process in the appointment calendar, for example, the aim is to give the subject reasons for the opinion to be acquired. Bolzano is not yet thinking of strategies in which reasons no longer play a role at all: the creation of a belief by taking a drug e.g. B. or through the targeted use of a hypno ti seur. 545 - Not everything that we would call self-deception falls under the term defined in (T5). Three years after Bolzano's speech, Jane Austen describes a very different kind of self-deception in chapter 19 of her novel Pride and Prejudice (1813). The pompous Mr. Collins proposes to Elizabeth Bennet. Elizabeth is completely confused and finally interrupts his oily flow of speech: 544. RW I, 56. Just like (and independently of) B. Armstrong resolves the paradoxes described: Armstrong (1), 168. 545. Cf. Williams (1) , 149ff. 216 ‘Accept my thanks for the compliment you are paying me. I am very sensitive of the honor of your proposals, but it is impos sible for me to do otherwise than decline them. '' I am not now to learn, 'replied Mr Collins, with a formal wave of the hand,' that it is usual with young ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first applies for their favor [...] '. ‘Upon my word, Sir,’ cried Elizabeth, ‘I am perfectly serious in my refusal […]’. 'You must give me leave to flatter myself […] that your refusal of my addresses is merely words of course […] I shall chuse to attribute it to your wish of increasing my love by suspense, according to the usual practice of elegant females . 'To such perseverance in wilful self deception Elizabeth would make no reply, and immediately and in silence withdrew. " A person's wish that proposition P be true can lead to reinterpreting data that speak against P to speak for P. That is exactly what Mr. Collins does. Unlike the self-deceiver in the sense of (T5), he considers the proposition that Eliza beth will accept his proposal to be true from the outset. His self-deception consists in figuring out the reaction of his loved one that he will allow him to hold onto that belief.546 6.4. Pretense and hypocrisy So far, following Bolzano, we have discussed various types of deception, (T). The following deals with forms of ver 546. On these and other strategies see Mele (1), 125ff. I have not been able to convince myself that the only way to conceptually rhyme with the phenomenon of self-deception is to let "two souls" dwell in the subject's chest [with Plato, Freud, and Davidson].) 217 try to deceive someone (VT): to pretend, hay lei, lies and slander. The definition (VT1) x tries to deceive y: ↔ ∑p ([1] x tries to make y believe that p, acquires or retains & [2] x believes that ¬ p) fixes the term of attempted deception.In a sense of deception that is wider than just defined, a person tries to deceive another when they either meet the definition of (VT1) or the definition of (VT2) x tries to hide something from y: ↔ ∑ p ([1] x tries to make y believe that p does not acquire & [2] x believes that p). Bolzano pursued the question of what pretense and what hypocrisy actually is in an exhort547 which, as a Bible text, was the basis of Jesus' punishment against the Pharisees and scribes. There it says - in Luther's translation: “Woe to you […], you hypocrites (ὑποκριταί) 548, who keep the cups and bowls clean inside, but inside it is full of robbery and food […] Woe to you […], you hypocrisy Those who are the same to you as the whitewashed graves, which seem pretty from a little, but inside they are full of dead bones and all filth. ”549 547. No. 341. B. already dealt with this subject in 1806 in a today clumsy speech deals: ER 15, 60. 548. In profane Greek this expression means something like 'actor'. See Bauer (1). 549. Mt 23: 25ff., In: Novum Testamentum Tetraglotton (1858), Zurich 1981. 218 It is instructive to compare Bolzano's conceptual analysis with Thomas von Aquin's study 'On pretense (simulatio) and hypocrisy (hypocrisis)'. 550 Both philosophers understand hypocrisy as a special case of pretense. But if one sticks to Thomas' explanation of the more general term, 551 the following applies: someone pretends to be pretending to be so and so about him, even though it is not about him at all - he does not have to intend to deceive anyone. I think that (with Bolzano) is a mistake. The term pretending can be defined as follows: 552 (As if) x pretends that φx: ↔ x tries to ensure that ((it seems to be the case that φx) & ¬φx ) The Definiens allows someone to pretend that this is the case without having the intention to deceive. And it allows that this is actually how it is with this person; because the negated conjunct is in the scope of the prologue x tries to ensure that ’. One can easily convince oneself of the adequacy of these two features of (As if). During the rehearsal, an actor can comply with the director's request to pretend he is drunk without wishing to deceive anyone, and he could do so even if he forgot his alcohol consumption before the rehearsal and only thinks he is sober. Unlike Thomas, Bolzano sees the pretense as a special kind of attempt at deception. Under the circumstances just described, he would not accuse the actor of pretending to be. (What looks like a dissent is, of course, not one if 'simulare' does not mean the same thing as 'pretend'.) Bolzano's analysis of the concept of hypocrisy is based on the following understanding of pretense (19/1, 223): 550. STh IIa IIae, q.111, in Thomas (2), vol. 20. 551. Ibid., A.1 corpus. 552. Following Anscombe (1), 85f. 219 (VT3) x is pretending to y: ↔ ∑φ ([1] x tries by pretending to y as if φx to ensure that y acquires or retains the opinion that φx & [2 ] x believes that ¬φx & [3] ¬φx) I ask the quantifier '∑φ' as an abbreviation of the prologue 'for at least one replacement of the predicate variable “φ” by a predicate to understand the following'. The 'by pretending' restriction in clause [1] is intended to exclude cases such as the following: a seriously ill person tries to make us believe that he is doing much better, but he is too weak to to even bring a smile to mind. He fails to pretend because he fails to pretend he's better.553 A person who pretends to be angry or having an orgasm pretends to be. Only when someone pretends to be deceitful does he disguise himself. The actor on stage may easily pretend to be angry, but he doesn't really want the audience to believe that it is him: he doesn't pretend, because the first condition in the definition is not met.554 Bolzano thinks that third condition rightly considered essential? Hänschen is afraid of math work. In order to be able to stay at home, he tries to convince his mother by moaning and groaning that he is ill. The mother gets the fever thermometer and, to Hänschen's surprise, finds out that he is actually sick. Has Hanschen pretended to be? If we answer this question in the affirmative, we reject clause [3]. 553. Cf. Anscombe (1), 86. 554. Sit venia exemplo: In the middle of a New York restaurant during a meal with Harry, Sally (Meg Ryan) pretends to have an orgasm - the woman at the next table then orders from the waiter “The same as what the young lady ordered”. In this scene Sally doesn't pretend - maybe she does if she really should have sex with Harry. 220 According to (VT3), misrepresentation is a case of second-level intentionality. Such a complex intention can only be had if you have learned to just pretend that something is going on around you and have noticed that you can mislead others in this way. Wittgenstein rightly says: “A child has to learn a lot before it can disguise itself” .555 That is why we would not believe anyone who surprises us with the assurance that he already hated his mother as an infant: his smile was always been pretense - he always shook his head contemptuously as soon as his mother turned her back on him. (It is only at the age of four - psychologists seem to agree on this - that we learn to pretend, and autistic adults just as little as one to three year old children have the ability to pretend.) From the question “Are we perhaps hasty to assume that the infant's smile is not a pretense? " Wittgenstein immediately moves on to the question: “Why can't a dog pretend? Is he too honest? ”556 Here and elsewhere he seems to overlook the fact that pretense is not always hypocrisy.557 The assumption that a dog is pretending is in fact much more bizarre than that of an infant pretending - and that has nothing to do with the not insignificant differences between pets and babies. We can learn from Thomas Aquinas and Bolzano what it has to do with: both rightly agree that the qualities that the hypocrite claims to have are of a very special kind. The differences between Thomas and Bolzano are no less revealing. 555. Wittgenstein (1), part II, xi, end, commented on illuminating by Schroe der (1), 157ff .; see also Anscombe (1), 91, 556. Wittgenstein (1), Part I, §§ 249f. 557. In the registers of Wittgenstein (2) one is rightly referred to the job information under the keyword “Verstellung” when using the keyword “hypocrisy”: Wittgenstein treats these words as if they express the same term. For Thomas, hypocrisy was hypocrisy. “In hypocrisi duo sunt: ​​[…] defectus sanctitatis, et simulatio eius (in hypocrisy there is both: the lack of holiness and its simulation).” 558 According to this conception, someone only feigns if there is a virtus of which it is true: he does not own it, but he pretends to have it.559 The hypocrisy that Molière in the figure of Tartuffe denounces560 and that La Rochefoucauld is characterized as the “homage of vice to virtue” is of this kind. 561 Bolzano, on the other hand, emphasizes: It does not always have to be [...] real virtues whose outer appearance he [the hypocrite] tries to give himself [...]; We often see him struggling for the appearance of such qualities which are in themselves faulty [...], but which are regarded as excellent by those persons for whose favor is to be done to him. Indeed, this kind of hypocrisy [...] is very common among us [...]. Or what is more common than that, in dealing with respected, powerful people, we pretend to have a certain deep admiration for them, a certain slavish subservience to our will among their own, of which we inwardly feel nothing at all? Isn't that hypocrisy […] of the worst kind that does not pursue the appearance of a virtue, but that of a vice […]? (19/1, 225). 558. STh IIa IIae, q.111, a. 4 corp., In Thomas (2), vol. 20. 559. Ibid. a. 3, ad 1. Cf. also Thomas (1) IV, dist. 16, q. 4, a.1 corp .: “Ilse qui cum non sit virtuosus, personam virtuosi ostendat, hypocrita dicitur (someone who - although he is not at all virtuous - behaves like a virtuous person is called a hypocrite)." 560. The first version of the comedy was performed in 1664 under the title ‘Tartuffe ou L’hypocrite’. In the list of people, Tartuffe appears as ‘faux dévot (bigot)’, and Cléante calls him ‘fanfaron de vertu (virtuous trumpeter, boaster)’. 561. "L’hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertu." (Maximes et réflexions morales, Paris 51678, n ° CCXVIII.) 222 When explaining the concept of hypocrisy, Bolzano emphasizes that it does not matter whether the hypocrite “only has the wrong opinion about him by his silence [562], or whether he himself produced it ”(19/1, 224). We have already taken into account this difference between the generation and maintenance of an opinion in the previous definitions. Finally, the motivation of the hypocrite must also be taken into account in the definition of the term. Someone who is deeply grieved or deeply disliked may disguise themselves because they care about the welfare of others. The hypocrite, however, always acts “for selfish reasons” (19/1, 223, 226f). (VT4) x feigns against y: ↔ ∑φ ([1] x tries, for selfish reasons, by pretending to y as if φx, to ensure that y acquires or retains the opinion that φx & [ 2] x believes that ¬φx & [3] ¬φx & [4] x believes that y believes that φ-ness is a privilege) Even those who treat or abuse their dog as a family member are unlikely to get too close forgive to ascribe to him the higher-level beliefs indicated in the fourth clause of the defining in (VT3). 6.5. Lies and untruthfulness Among the concepts of deception and attempts to deceive, which we will get an overview of on these pages with the help of Bolzano, the concept of the lie was the first that he discussed in his speeches.563 562. Cf. the appendix about language (67). 563. No. 245, in the spring of 1810. He had already dealt with this subject on December 14, 2006 in an exhortation that has now disappeared: ER 15, 69. I 223 To start from clear terms: that is what one is looking for, my friends first has to pay attention to every examination. Even today, when we want to talk about the duty of truthfulness, we must first establish the concept that we associate with this word. This is all the more necessary here since people form such fluctuating, extremely vague and often incorrect ideas of what is called a lie, and on the contrary what truthfulness requires, that they do not seldom form what is really a lie is to be considered quite compatible with truthfulness, and mutually [564] consider what can very well exist with truthfulness to be a lie. The correct and definite term, my friends, is this: You only lie, but also always when you knowingly and willingly give the opportunity for our fellow human being to believe something that we ourselves consider to be wrong on our testimony and takes on. He who never allows himself to do this is true. [565] (17/2, 294) The predicate ‘x testifies to y that p’ applies (according to the explanation that Bol zano gives in his lectures566) to two people if one person tries to tell the other that p. We can therefore reiterate his definition of the lie as follows: Now just look at his explanation of this concept. For his discussion of the ethical question of whether a lie is ever allowed, see Künne (20), chap. IV / 6. 564. In the sense of 'in the opposite direction', 'vice versa'. Ade lung: “each other. 1) Opposed to another thing; but only in Upper German. " 565. 'Truthful' in the sense of 'truthful', as in Kant (5), 421: “It may be that not everything is true what a person thinks it is (because he can be wrong), but in everything he does says he must be truthful (he should not deceive). " and in Schiller im Wallenstein, Die Piccolomini, III / 5: "[...], he is true, / is undisguised and hates the crooked paths." 566. RW I, 80-84. 224 B (VT5) x lies to y: ↔ ∑p ([1] x tries by telling y that p to make y believe that p acquires or retains & [2] x believes that ¬ p). The addressee of the lie is in the subsequent area of ​​the relation - the definiendum is a stylistic variant of ‘x lies to y’. (Bolzano adds - a person is “truthful” if and only if they never lie to anyone. I will make a reservation towards the end of this chapter.) Bolzano's first comment on his proposed definition concerns clause [2] of the definition: Why is it here not just '¬ p'? (In answering this question, he assumes that the attempt to communicate that is mentioned in [1] consists in x saying something to y.) Only [...] whether we do what we say to others To consider oneself true or false, it comes down to lies and truthfulness; but not on what is considered true or false in oneself [...]. Do you speak differently than you think; do you speak yes with your mouth when you think no and no when you think yes in your heart: [567] look! then you lie and have lied even if it should subsequently show that [...] the matter really behaved as you said it was. That we do no violence to the use of language by defining words, my friends, that words, lies and truthfulness, when they are most definitely used, are taken in precisely this sense: that shines in the eye by itself. (17/2, 294f.) 567. Cf. Sallust's winged word (Catil. 10, 5) about the liar: “aliud clau sum in pectore, aliud in lingua promptum est (one thing is locked in his chest, something else lies on his tongue) ”, quoted by Augustinus (3), col. 241, German 409, and by Kant (6), 429. 225 The question of whether an utterance is a lie is not the actual truth value of what is said is decisive, but rather the conviction of the speaker - someone can lie, although he is saying something true. Bolzano admits that our use of the word ‘lying’ is not always the most “definite”. In fact, That's a lie! ’Is often used in colloquial language (as Wahrig's German dictionary states) in the sense of That is not true!’. But the regrettable fact that many speakers of German use the words 'apparently' and 'apparently' as if they mean the same thing does not eliminate the difference. Bolzano agrees with Augustinus568 and Thomas von Aquin569 that clause [2] must not be replaced by ‘¬p’. That he also has Kant on his side is shown in the essay ‘On a supposed right to lie out of human love’. There Kant asks the reader to imagine the following situation: A's lascivious persecutor asked you at gunpoint whether A was at home, and when you answered you were convinced that A was at home. “[H] if you […] lied and said he was not at home and he actually went out (although unconsciously)”, your “good-natured lie” could have dire consequences for A .570 In his story 'Le mur' (1937), Jean Paul Sartre dramatizes this thought experiment: Pablo, the captured Spanish freedom fighter, does not want to reveal the leader's hiding place to the Falangists who interrogate him . If he says to them: The man you are looking for is hiding in the cemetery ’, then he is lying. He wants to lead her astray; because he is certain that the person he is looking for is somewhere else.To his horror, Pablo later learns that he told the Falangists something wrong against his intention. - Here is a less dramatic case: Hänschen is afraid of math 568. Augustine (1), 64 // 65, and (2), col. 239f., German 408f. Augustine's investigations into the concept of the lie are contained in (1), written c. 395, (2), c. 420 and (3), c. 422. 569. STh IIa IIae q.110, a.1 corp ., in Thomas (2), Vol. 20. 570. Kant (7), 427, 426, my italics. 226 work. In order to be able to stay at home, he says with a groan: "I'm sick, mom." He's lying; because he considers himself very healthy. The mother fetches the thermometer and, to Hänschen's surprise, finds that he has a fever. Two days later, the rash typical of scarlet fever becomes visible. Pablo and Hänschen are telling something true, although they are not telling the truth. When asked about the whereabouts of the wanted man, Pablo did not deceive the Falangists - and when asked about his health, Hänschen did not deceive his mother. So not all lies fulfill clause [2] in (T1), the falsehood condition in the definition of the concept of deception. The verb 'to lie' is not contra factual (as the verbs in 'pretend that p' and 'think that p'), but non factual (as the verbs in 'claim that p' and 'believe, that p '). A lie does not always satisfy the condition [1] in (T1), the success condition of the deception, - some lies are so clumsy that nobody falls for them.571 X only tries to tell Y that p, if X wants his intention to ensure that Y the opinion that p acquires or retains is recognized by Y.572 Bolzano draws attention to this. that not every attempt at deception fulfills this condition: If an educator does not immediately tear the child, who believes he is alone and unseen, out of his error, but only looks at it [...]: this is not the cause that the child was mistaken ? But is such a deception a lie? (17/2, 295) This example of a deliberate deception, which is not brought about by an attempt to communicate, also shows that 571.Sissela Bok is wrong when she describes the lying in her book Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978) classified it as a species of the genus illusion. 572. On the matter cf. also Grice (1), 217ff. 227 we proceeded in Bolzano’s sense when, in explaining the concept of deception in (T1), we not only considered the creation of an error: the observer leaves the child in his belief that it is unobserved. Let us consider another attempt at deception that does not meet the above condition for an attempt to report: the murderer puts the murder weapon in the hand of her victim. She wants to ensure that the Commissioner gets the opinion that it is a suicide. What you do is an attempt to deceive, but not a lie; because she does not testify to the inspector - she does not try to tell him - that it is a suicide. She by no means wants him to recognize her intention to ensure that he comes to believe that it is a question of suicide. According to Bolzano's proposed definition, a person can lie even when he is de facto not deceiving anyone, but he only lies when he wants to deceive another person. This does not mean that he also wants to cheat her in the sense of (T4). The liar can care about the well-being of those whom he lies to. The title character in Jurek Becker's novel Jakob the Liar (1969) lives in an Eastern European ghetto during the German occupation. Jakob makes his fellow sufferers believe that he owns a radio and reports to them of the defeats of the German troops on the Eastern Front and of the imminent liberation by the Red Army. He saves her from the deepest despair. Augustine already emphasized that a lie always includes an intention to deceive (voluntas fallendi )573, and many philosophers followed him and Bolzano in it.574 Bolzano's definition contains two 573. In Augustine (1), 68 // 69, it says: “Mendacium est enunciatio falsum enuntiare volentis ut fallat (A lie is a statement made by someone who wants to give false evidence in order to deceive someone)." The prerequisite that goes into this definition, which Augustine only puts up for discussion here, namely that the lie essentially includes the intent to deceive, he later explicitly adopts: cf. (2) 244 // 245 and (3) col. 243, dt 415. 574. The same view is held, among others G.E. Moore, J. Barwise & J. Etchemendy, Bernard Williams and Mark Sainsbury: Evidence in Künne (18), 27. 228 intentions to deceive declared necessary. Firstly, it demands that the liar has a ‘thematic’ intention to deceive: he wants the addressee to falsely believe that p. But the definition calls for another deception. Anyone who tries to tell someone that p wants them to take him for someone who believes that p. Secondly, the definition requires that the liar has an 'expressive' intent to deceive: he wants the addressee to falsely believe that he believes that, according to p.575 Bol zanos (VT5), the liar wants the first of these goals through he is enough to reach the second. Regarding the quality of being someone who believes what he is saying to someone, the following applies: a speaker to whom the definition of Bolzano's definition applies believes (rightly) that he does not have this quality has, but by pretending to have her, he tries to make others believe he has her. It is thus disguised in the sense fixed in (VT3). If autistic and one to three year old children cannot pretend, then they certainly cannot lie. The pretending of the liar is a case of third level intentionality: 576 an intention that is "directed" at an opinion, which in turn is about an opinion. One of the first philosophers to deny that the only way to lie is to try to deceive someone was Thomas Aquinas. The intention to deceive, he believes, is not part of the essence of the lie - it only concerns the perfectio (the completion, the final conclusion) of the lie.577 Unfortunately, his argumentation is very opaque. Thomas would be right if he only wanted to say: Whether a statement is a lie does not depend on whether the producer of the statement succeeds in making the addressee believe something wrong. The fact that the liar is unsuccessful is sometimes because the addressee does not consider him sincere. 575. Cf. also Black (1), 44 f .; Chisholm & Feehan (1), 153; Simpson (1), 624f. 576. Cf. Dennett (1), 275, on “third order intentions”. 577. STh IIa IIae q.110, a.1 corp. & ad 3, in Thomas (2), Vol. 20. 229 Sometimes it is because in her eyes too much speaks against what he gives her to understand. And sometimes it's because he said something truthful without wanting to. (If, I believe, the word 'lie' has an implication of success in our usage - verbs like 'find' and 'defeat' are comparable in it, then we can also formulate this point as follows: you can lie without lying to someone Be that as it may, the word 'lie' is just as free of any implication of success as the verbs 'seek' and 'fight'.) But with the evidence that deception is not part of the essence of the lie, Thomas would of course not have yet shows that there is no intention to deceive in their nature. With that evidence, Thomas ran open doors to Augustine and Bolzano. The definition in Bolzanos (VT5) does not imply that the liar's attempt is successful. Frege, too, did not believe that the essence of a lie was an intention to deceive. Rather en passant (which is why his contribution is almost never noticed in the more recent debate about the concept of a lie), he defines the concept of a lie as follows: 578 Frege (L without VT) x lies (compared to y): ↔ ∑ p [1] x asserts (versus y) that p & [2] x believes that ¬p. Obviously, like Augustine, Thomas and Bolzano, Frege does not want to rule out that the liar is telling something true. With the additions in the brackets, I tried to improve his explanation. When one asserts something, one asserts something as true, and one can do that without addressing a listener or reader. (The lonely night owl, who at the 578th Frege (2), 37, note 8: “In 'A lied that he saw the B', the subordinate clause means a thought, of which it is first said that A has him as claimed true, and secondly, that A was convinced of his falsehood. ”Cf. also Frege (4), 252. 230 Bus stop when looking at the timetable mumbles: 'Damn it! Now I missed the last bus', claimed something .) But an assertion can only be a lie if it has an addressee.579 Figures of speech such as understatement and irony seem to speak against Frege's definition: - X opens his report on how Z smashed the furniture yesterday in a fit of rage, by saying to Y: 'Z was a bit excited yesterday.' Or: - X tells Y how he was shamefully abandoned by Z, and he closes his report with the words: 'You see, Z really is a real friend . 'In both cases the speaker thinks what he is literally about wrong Z says; but he's not lying. This seems to indicate that Frege's explanation is inadequate. But appearances may be deceptive. In the cases described, did X really claim to Y what he literally said about Z? Wouldn't he have denied the main part of his reports on Z by uttering the sentences just quoted? Augustine has described a situation whose assessment in the light of Bolzanos (VT5) turns out differently than in the light of Frege's definition: - The speaker believes that the path the listener wants to take is dangerous; Several travelers have reported to him that bandits are lurking along the way. The wellbeing of the listener is important to the speaker. He would therefore like to see that she changes her route. Now her relationship with him is unfortunately marked by deep mistrust - he knows that she will not believe him. He therefore asserts: 'The path that you take a 579. In Chisholm & Feehan (1), 152,' assertion 'is defined in such a way that clause [1] in Freges (L) is only satisfied if if clause [1] in B (VT5) is fulfilled. I don't think that's a good idea. Suppose a maid is accused of theft by her superiors in the hotel manager's office. At the end of the interrogation, she exclaimed desperately: 'I know that nobody here believes me, but I did not steal any jewels from the lady in room 101.' This statement is coherent and in it she claims that she did not take the jewelry Has. It is not dangerous.'580 - If we adhere to Frege's proposed definition, we have to say that the speaker lied; because he has asserted something that he is convinced is false. But he doesn't do this to make the listener believe it is true. So the thematic intent to deceive required in Bolzano's definition is missing. That is why Bolza no would absolve the well-meaning travel advisor from the accusation of lying. He can (and should) admit that the speaker has a different intent to deceive: he does not want her to be wrong about the dangerous situation, but he wants her to be wrong about him, about his intentions: he wants, that she thinks he wants to deceive them about the danger. (That is not the expressive intention of deception that Bolzanos (VT5) demands of the liar: it consists in making the addressee believe that he himself believes what he says, and this is the goal of the travel advisor who is probably thinking in the case of the The addressee who is maximally suspicious of him is unreachable.) Is the thematic intent to deceive that Bolzano attributes to every liar really a sine qua non of lies? The following example speaks against it.581 Looking out of a window in his apartment, the old hippie Bob Deelan sees two men inspecting the back of his neglected garden. To his boundless displeasure, he notes that they have just discovered the hemp (cánnabis satīva) that he planted behind the elder bush last year. The doorbell rings, the men show their ID and one of them says: ‘Sorry to disturb you, Mr. Deelan. We're from the drug squad. We're looking at a couple of gardens in the suburbs for an advertisement. Could it be that hemp grows in your garden? ’No, definitely not!’, Replies Bob. He hopes that the gentlemen will relieve him in the following ‘conversation’ that he has no idea what is blooming and flourishing in the neglected garden. One is inclined to say that Bob is lying, and Frege’s definition justifies this 580. Augustine (1), 64 // 65. 581. I owe it to Lisa Grunenberg. 232 inclination. But he has no thematic deception intent; because he knows only too well that the officials discovered cannabis a long time ago. In Bob's case there is no thematic intent to deceive, but an expressive one: he wants the police officers to believe that he himself believes what he says. Augustine has described a case in which, conversely, the thematic intent to deceive is given, but not the expressive one. This time the speaker is a malevolent travel advisor: he knows that bandits are lurking on the path the listener wants to take, and he wants it to fall into their hands. But now he knows that she won't believe him. He therefore claims: ‘The path you want to take is dangerous.’582 - Here the speaker wants to make the listener believe something that he thinks is wrong, namely that the path is safe. So he wants to äus deceive her ’. Now the speaker believes what he claims; but he by no means wants the listener to mistake him for someone who believes what he says. Since he does not rely on her, there is no attempt to communicate, and therefore Bolzano's proposed definition absolves him of the charge of lying: Augustine's second travel advisor is therefore an evil one, but he is not a liar either. Grillparzer staged a similar case in his not very funny comedy ‘Woe to him who lies’. The kitchen boy Leon repeatedly announced his escape from Edrita's father's house loudly, but so loudly that no one took his announcement seriously. When he really makes preparations to flee, Edrita accuses him of having acted “with deceit and wrong”. Leon. With deception and falsehood? Edrita. You want to escape. Leon. I never concealed it. Edrita. Oh yes, yes! And that's why you think you're true? Not so? Did you also speak the truth 582. Augustine (1) 66 // 67. 233 chen, < die="" hand="" aufs="" herz="" legend="">